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LEAVING THE THICKET AT LAST 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
The Law of Democracy is in a state of incoherence.  The ex-
periment begun by Baker v. Carr showed great promise, yet 
soon gave way to disappointment.  The promise was one of 
modest review and respect for political choices made else-
where.  The reality has been far from that.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court displays an aggressive posture towards questions of 
politics, yet refuses to intervene in political gerrymandering 
controversies, the one area where intervention appears nor-
matively warranted.  The Court throws its weight around the 
political thicket at will, arbitrarily and with little semblance of 
rationality, irrespective of doctrine, precedent or history.  It is 
time for the Court to return to the promise of Baker and a 
standard of heightened rationality across the law of democ-
racy.  Absent that, it should call it a day and leave the thicket 
at last. 
Courts ought not enter this political thicket.1
My own sense . . . is that the current Court is 
deeply distrustful of the political branches 
and ambitious for its own power.  And so, it 
will plunge even further into the political 
thicket, ever more encroaching on the power 
of the political branches.  Like Macbeth, it 
will find it impossible to wade no more.2
 Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law— Bloomington.  
B.A., 1990, J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001, University of Michigan; LL.M., 
2002, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am terribly grateful to John Applegate, Guy 
Charles, Jim Chen, Ken Dau-Schmidt, Mike Gerhardt, Charlie Geyh, Ajay Mehrotra, 
Christie Ochoa, David Williams and Susan Williams for reading earlier versions of this 
Article and offering helpful comments.  I am also grateful for the opportunity to present 
earlier versions of this Article during a works-in-progress colloquium at the Indiana Uni-
versity -Bloomington School of Law, a junior faculty workshop at the University of Min-
nesota Law School, and at the 2006 Big Ten Untenured Conference.  All errors remain 
my own.  
1 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).   
2 Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the 
Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 698 (2002); 
see Pamela S. Karlan, Northing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection 
From Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1366(2001) (“Once again, as 
it did in the Shaw cases, the Court intervened [in Bush v. Gore] to short circuit the nor-
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If there was ever any doubt, none should remain after the Court’s de-
cision in LULAC v. Perry:3 the law of democracy is one messy thicket 
indeed and the Court is stuck within it.  Over the space of 6 opinions and 
132 pages, the Court announced the following: (1) a majority is yet to 
find a suitable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering ques-
tions; (2) the fact that a legislative majority enlisted the redistricting ma-
chinery of the state mid-decade adds nothing to the previous point; and 
(3) the state can’t essentialize Latinos – or Blacks, or anybody else, it 
would appear.   
For one who came of age in the voting rights field during the dark 
ages of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny,4 the nuance of this last point bears 
repeating: not all Latinos are the same for purposes of representation and 
redistricters may not treat them as if they are.  The point seems espe-
cially remarkable coming from Justice Kennedy, the same Justice who 
seldom if ever sides with the interests of people of color,5 and appears to 
cast an intriguing light on the future challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act.  In particular, and as Adam Cohen conjectured in 
the New York Times some months ago, we must wonder how shifting to 
the center of the Court and becoming the deciding vote on these impor-
tant issues will affect Justice Kennedy.6 If LULAC teaches us anything, 
it may be that we cannot read Justice Kennedy on race as well as we 
thought we could. 
The case is remarkable for how it failed to advance our understand-
ing of the fundamental conflicts in the law of democracy.  What do we 
know today that we did not know prior to LULAC? Nothing.  Take, for 
example, Kennedy’s anti-essentialist point.  There is nothing new there; 
this “insight” flows directly from the Shaw line of cases.7 Consider also 
the political gerrymandering non-argument.  We would generally expect 
the Court to interpret the Constitution and develop standards as de-
 
mal, albeit potentially contentious and messy, process of self-government. The Court's 
decision left in its wake weakened institutions.”). 
3 26 S.Ct. 2594 (2006). 
4 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Eas-
ley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
5 See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 503 U.S. 491 (1992) (offering a 
narrow reading of the coverage provision of the Voting Rights act); Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (concluding that redistricting plans are subject to the predominant 
factor test) 
6 See Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy is Ready for his Close-Up, N.Y. TIMES,
April 3, 2006. 
7 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (“But where the State assumes 
from a group of voters' race that they ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls,’ it engages in racial stereotyping at odds with 
equal protection mandates.”) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 530, 647 (1993)); Guy-
Uriel E. Charles and Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the 
New Millenium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227 (2001). 
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manded by some accepted norm of constitutional interpretation.  Instead, 
we find the Court in a public display of futility, fracturing along compet-
ing lines while asking for help in locating these hard-to-find standards.  
So for all the waiting, all the arguments, and all the time and expense, 
the Court offered nothing new.  This is not the behavior of a Court in 
charge of the political thicket as guided by constitutional norms, but 
rather, of a Court that has nothing to offer. This is hardly an endorsement 
of the Court and its role in the law of democracy. 
It is time to call it a day.  The experiment begun by Baker v. Carr 
had great promise and the best of intentions.  Yet all too soon, the Court 
forgot both the reasons that led it to enter this political minefield and the 
complexities that made the law of democracy particularly difficult to 
adjudicate.  Worse yet, it has now become clear that the Court is throw-
ing its weight in the political thicket at will, arbitrarily, and irrespective 
of doctrine, precedent or history.  It is time for the Court to exit this mo-
rass once and for all.8
This Essay defends this position over the course of four Parts.  Part I 
discusses the special nature of political questions and the reasons why 
the law of democracy presents the Court with unique challenges.  Part II 
contends that the political question doctrine is now dead and the Court 
no longer hesitates on the question of judicial power.  This is the clear 
lesson of the reapportionment revolution.  Once the Court betrayed the 
promise of Baker v. Carr and exalted the equipopulation principle as the 
standard of choice, it soon became a platonic guardian of sorts, willing 
and able to regulate the law of democracy in accordance to its own views 
about the political process.  The Court could extend this principle quite 
far, and take on the outcome of presidential elections.9
Parts III document this development and concludes that the Court is 
confused and ultimately incoherent in its handling of questions of race 
and politics. More damningly, this is a story where ideology and judicial 
attitudes are in command of adjudication.  In conclusion, Part IV advo-
cates a return to the promise of Baker v. Carr and a doctrine of height-
ened rationality.  Absent that, the Court should leave the thicket at last. 
I. On the Special Nature of Political Questions 
“Some claims of unconstitutionality, however much they may be 
wrapped in the form of conventional litigation,” wrote Justice Frank-
furter in 1934, “the Court will never adjudicate.”10 These were the noto-
 
8 For strategies about accomplishing this goal, see Karlan, supra note 2. 
9 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
10 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United States, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 424 (1934), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PA-
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rious political questions, outcasts in a legal universe where courts decide 
all matters, great and small, brought to their attention.  Judges would 
decide these questions at their own peril, Justice Frankfurter explained, 
for they are “not suited for settlement by the training and technique and 
the body of judicial experience which guide a court.”11 These questions 
were unwieldy, imprecise, and best left alone, to be handled and resolved 
by the political process.  As for how to define the boundaries of such 
questions, Justice Frankfurter left open a small window, as “the wisdom 
of the Court defines its boundaries.”12 
It is now commonplace to document the demise of the Frankfurte-
rian view of political questions as a central component of our constitu-
tional law orthodoxy.  And in fairness, the political question doctrine has 
been long dead, as exemplified by the Court’s foray into presidential 
elections and vote recounts in Bush v. Gore.13 Yet, as this Part argues, 
Justice Frankfurter’s shadow looms large over the law of democracy, 
even if conceding that his influence is relatively modest.14 Three fea-
tures of the law of democracy counsel for a judicial posture couched in 
humility and restraint. 
A. Stalking Horses and the Question of Power 
The first feature dates at least as far back as Justice Frankfurter’s 
forceful admonition in Colegrove v. Green:15 the Court must be particu-
larly careful in this arena, lest it be confused with yet another actor in the 
process.  To his mind, complainants are essentially asking the Court to 
intervene in party contests while dressing up their prior defeat in the po-
litical process “in the abstract phrases of the law.”16 Put another way, the 
law of democracy must of necessity take sides in politically charged con-
troversies, and invoking doctrines and constitutional clauses does noth-
ing to alter that fact.  Robert Dixon made a similar point soon after the 
Court’s explicit entry into the realm of politics in Baker v. Carr,17 when 
 
PERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1939, at 26 (Archibald Mac Leish and E. F. Pritchard, 
Jr., 1939). 
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of De-
mocracy: Of Political Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1899 (2006). 
14 On this point, it agrees with Norman Dorsen when he writes that Justice Frank-
furter’s “judicial legacy has been surprisingly limited.”  Norman Dorsen, Book Review,
95 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368 (1981) (reviewing H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX 
FRANKFURTER (1981)). 
15 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
16 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554. 
17 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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he complained that the case was “an invitation to courts to sit in judg-
ment on the structure of political power; even to effect a judicial transfer 
of political power.”18 
This point has not been lost on indefatigable plaintiffs wishing to 
challenge the electoral outcome of their choice.  To lose in the political 
process is to return to fight another day in the courts, under a dizzying 
array of available doctrinal tools, from Article 1 and the First or Four-
teenth Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, campaign finance law 
and/or state law principles.19 These challenges are known as “stalking 
horse” cases, and the litigants are often defeated candidates or the politi-
cal parties themselves looking for any chance to upset settled political 
outcomes.20 In turn, much of the effort within the law of democracy is 
focused not on the vindication of individual rights by aggrieved litigants, 
but on the use of the courts as a means to the achievement of the larger 
goal of electoral success.  Bush v. Gore was one such case, yet hardly 
stands alone.21 The incentives created by the law of elections guarantee 
as much. 
B. The Political Question in Context: Power Meets Fear  
The second feature harkens back to Justice Frankfurter’s reasons for 
refusing to enlist the Court in the hard work of regulating democratic 
institutions.  These were arguments for which the political question doc-
trine did much of the heavy lifting.  The classical strand of the doctrine 
made a fleeting appearance, and the view that this was an area exclusive 
for Congress to regulate.22 But the Court has never really paid much 
 
18 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 367, 368 (1963). 
19 See Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judi-
cial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004). 
20 See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the 
Post-Shaw Era, Cumb. L. Rev. 287, 297 n. 60 (1995-96); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights 
to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1733-35 (1993) (de-
scribing the strategic use by interested partisans of the equipopulation rule and the Voting 
Rights Act); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV.
1605, 1608 (1999) (discussing the Karcher opinion and complaining that “[t]he ‘right’ 
claimed here, as often in political cases, was obviously a stalking horse for other inter-
ests”). 
21 See Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, 
at 1252 (1995) (Edward Blum, plaintiff in the Texas wrongful districting case, was an 
unsuccessful Republican candidate for Congress in one of the challenged districts); id. at 
358 (George L. DeLoach, plaintiff in the Georgia wrongful districting case, was an un-
successful candidate in the Eleventh District Democratic primary). 
22 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551 (1946).  For a contrary view, see ALEX-
ANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 190-91 (2d ed. 1986). (disagreeing that Colegrove stands for the view that the 
Constitution leaves to Congress exclusive authority to monitor congressional elections, 
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attention to this argument.  More important was the prudential strand, 
and the notion that the Court must traverse this terrain carefully.  The 
question wasn’t whether the Court had the power to handle these ques-
tions, for the Court clearly did.23 Rather, the question was whether the 
Court should.  This was a real concern for Justice Frankfurter, for in the 
end Congress may reject the Court’s work.24 And to Justice Frankfurter, 
the Court “ought not enter this political thicket”,25 lest it risk eroding its 
considerable yet fragile legitimacy and public standing. 
The advent of Baker v. Carr set these fears aside and brought the po-
litical question doctrine to its knees.  It also offers the first lesson of the 
reapportionment revolution and its aftermath.  The real question in Baker 
focused on the Court’s power to hear these difficult and contested 
claims.  Critics of the opinion,26 as well as lower courts across the coun-
try,27 understood Colegrove to bar review.  Yet the Court set this and oth-
ers precedents aside with a simplicity that spoke volumes about the 
Court and its desire to correct a perceived wrong.  On the question of 
Colegrove as precedent, for example, the Court counted votes and con-
cluded that four of the seven voting Justices upheld a grant of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter.28 Even Frankfurter’s controlling opinion 
appeared “questionable” on this issue.  The political question doctrine 
did not fare much better.  The Court took on the Guarantee Clause head 
on and concluded that the inquiry here was “primarily a function of the 
separation of powers.”29 The question was thus whether the Constitution 
has committed the matter under review to another branch of government, 
or whether the actions exceed the grant of authority as exercised by the 
 
as both the 14th and 15th Amendment may be said to so authorize the Court to play a role 
in this area); see also Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative 
Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711 (1963) (“That such a 
claim is within the subject matter committed to the Court seems beyond dispute.”). 
23 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Both opin-
ions joining the result in Colegrove v. Green agreed that considerations were controlling 
which dictated denial of jurisdiction though not in the strict sense of want of power.”). 
24 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552-53 
25 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.  But see Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting 
for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 14 (1962) 
(“[Colegrove] can satisfy only if one starts with the postulate that judicial wisdom . . . 
always consists in judicial self-restrain, and that the reasons preferred for such restraint 
are . . . always to pass for well-founded, if stated in the set terms of art.”). 
26 See Philip B. Kurland, Foreword – Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 149 
(1964) (“It is impossible to believe that the Court was as artless as it represented itself to 
be; it is difficult to believe that the Court thought it could find an audience ingenious 
enough to accept the assertion [that Baker did not conflict with precedents].”). 
27 See Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Tenn. 1959). 
28 Baker, 369 U.S. at 202. 
29 Id. at 210. 
Essay 8
proper branch.  And that question belongs to the Court “as ultimate in-
terpreter of the Constitution.”30 Put in simple terms: this was a case, 
ergo the Court may decide it.  On Baker’s logic, one may even conclude 
that it has an “unsought responsibility” to so act.  The reception for this 
line of argument was far from unanimous.31 
And so the first lesson of Baker and its progeny should be clear: 
questions of politics are no different from questions of constitutional law 
writ large.32 Seen this way, the chasm between Justice Frankfurter and 
the Baker majority was simply a disagreement grounded in principle – 
not law – about how to handle these questions.  To Justice Frankfurter, 
these cases should not be brought within the constitutional law ortho-
doxy.  A majority of the Court resoundingly thought otherwise.   
C. Standards (and the Endless Search for Stone Tablets) 
The third feature also finds expression in the reapportionment de-
bates.  Justice Frankfurter’s complaint boiled down to the fact that these 
were political conflicts of the highest order, a “clash of political forces in 
political settlements.”33 And he was undoubtedly right about that.  The 
question under review in Baker was a political question, plain and sim-
ple, a matter that entailed “accommodating the incommensurable factors 
of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles.”34 Among these, he 
included the following:  
Considerations of geography, demography, electoral 
convenience, economic and social cohesion of divergen-
cies among particular local groups, communications, the 
practical effects of political institutions like the lobby 
and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of set-
tled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long ex-
perience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, 
censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.35 
30 Id. at 211. 
31 See Kurland, supra note 26, at 149. 
32 See, on this point, Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 
371, 372 (2004) (“But I do not think that electoral law can be cut free from constitutional 
law more generally, which requires the Court to continue playing an active role in defin-
ing basic norms.”). 
33 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).267. 
34 Id. at 268. 
35 Id. at 323-24.  Alexander Bickel similarly asked, how to craft representative in-
stitutions with everything that such a difficult task entails?  This was a difficult ques-
tions, since  
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“To charge the courts with th[is] task,” he concluded, “is to attribute, 
however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.”36 
Justice Frankfurter must get his due on this issue, whatever else we 
may think of his larger arguments.  How would a court decide from 
among all these competing considerations in crafting a districting plan?  
To the critics, the Court’s answer fell far short, for the opinion offered 
neither a workable, manageable standard for examining redistricting 
plans37 nor, assuming an equal protection violation, did the opinion ex-
plain what remedies a court was authorized to grant.38 
To the Court, however, these questions proved far too easy and 
hardly worthy of much discussion.  The lower courts would simply de-
termine whether the plans under review violate equal protection by turn-
ing to the “well developed and familiar” equal protection standards.  As 
the Court explained, somewhat hastily and opaquely, “it has been opened 
to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to deter-
mine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects 
no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”39 And as for the 
question of remedies, the Court offered the following: “we have no cause 
at this stage to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief if 
violations of constitutional rights are found.”40 The critics were far from 
impressed.41 
Yet the Court hardly blinked.  A scant two years later, during the 
1963 Term, the Court came back to the thicket in full force. In the prin-
 
It remains in large part perhaps unfortunately, a task of pragmatic 
trial and error to construct representative deliberative institutions that 
are responsive to the views, the interests, and the aspirations of het-
erogeneous total constituencies, and that are yet not so fragmented or 
finely balanced as to be incapable of decisive action. 
BICKEL, supra note 22, at 192.   
36 Baker, 369 U.S. at 268. 
37 See Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: 
The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (1962) (“Nowhere does the Court 
indicate, by dictum or otherwise, what standards might be used in determining the valid-
ity of an apportionment scheme which creates such inequalities.”); Robert G. McCloskey, 
Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 62-4 (1962). 
38 See Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.
252, 262 (“The issue, of course, was not what remedy would be ‘most appropriate’ but 
whether any remedy at all lay within the power of a federal court of equity acting within 
its discretion, an issue which it could hardly have been ‘improper’ to consider in advance 
of trial.”). 
39 Baker, 369 U.S. at 226. 
40 Id. at 198. 
41 See Neal, supra note 38, at 262 (“For the Court to remove that issue from the 
case, if that was its meaning, by asserting that it had ‘no cause . . . to doubt’ was little less 
than an expression of contempt for the views of numerous other responsible judges.”). 
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cipal case of Reynolds v. Sims,42 the Court sidestepped a great deal of 
important information from the lower courts and moved ahead with its 
standard of choice, the now familiar equipopulation principle. As it ex-
plained, “Full and effective participation by all citizens in state govern-
ment requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the 
election of members of his state legislature.”43 This meant, more spe-
cifically, that population was “the controlling criterion”44 for judging 
districting plans. 
This conclusion was neither surprising nor radical in light of Baker 
and the egregious population disparities then in existence.  The simplic-
ity of the standard is undeniable, particularly under its traditional moni-
ker of “one person, one vote.”  It bespeaks of common sense, traditional 
democratic values and majority rule, qualities that help explain why the 
public embraced the Court’s intervention.45 After all, who could dis-
agree with a constitutional rule that demands that each vote count as 
much as another? 
Unsurprisingly, members of Congress could disagree, and some of 
them fought hard to reverse the Court’s decision or blunt its impact.46 
Part of this response was undoubtedly self-interested.  Yet it is worth 
remembering that the equality principle at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment offered the Court multiple doctrinal paths and could find 
expression in innumerable judicial standards.  Put another way, the equi-
population standard was not demanded by constitutional precedent, text, 
or history, as Justice Frankfurter forcefully argued in his Baker dissent.  
The standard was certainly simple to administer, but as John Ely ex-
plained, the harder task was in explaining what else it had to commend 
it.47 This was not like the issue in Brown, were the equality principle 
offered the Court a self-evident path to equality.  No such path existed 
here, and so the Reynolds opinion must be understood for what it is: a 
moment in the Court’s history when the justices drew a line in the sand 
and carved a doctrinal niche from among competing rationales.  The 
Court chose a line and committed to it, and all it took was courage and 
conviction.  As for the second lesson of the reapportionment revolution: 
we should not forget, particularly in light of the Court’s hesitations in 
Vieth and its professed inability to locate a standard to govern political 
 
42 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
43 Id. at 565. 
44 Id. at 567. 
45 Robert McCloskey attributed this overwhelming reaction to a “latent consen-
sus.”  See McCloskey, supra note 37, at 58-59. 
46 See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: 
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 231-38 (1964). 
47 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980). 
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gerrymandering controversies,48 that the Court in Reynolds pulled its 
standard of choice essentially out of a hat.49 
II. Lessons from the Past: On the Demise of Political Questions; or, 
How the Logic of Baker Took Over the Law of Elections 
Baker and Reynolds tell an important story about the Court and its 
power in contemporary American politics.  Taken together, they make 
clear that the Court’s power extends as far as the justices demand that it 
does, cabined only by pragmatic considerations.  Recall in this vein 
Robert Dixon’s prescient analysis; to his mind, Baker was an invitation 
for courts to judge the structures of political power, or “even to effect a 
judicial transfer of political power.”50 This is an important point in two 
ways.  Note first that Baker was only an invitation to courts, not a re-
quirement that they do so.  This is clearly right, and the reason why 
Baker must be understood as contra distinct from Reynolds and the equi-
population revolution.  Baker allows for intrusion into politics yet clearly 
stops short of aggressive judicial intervention.51 Yet the Court pushed 
this invitation to its limits, leading Professor Dixon to remark soon after 
the Court’s decision in Reynolds and its companion cases,52 “[c]ourts not 
only have entered the thicket, they occupy it.”53 The second point un-
 
48 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (“As the following discussion 
reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political 
gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.”). 
49 For a discussion on this point, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the 
Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair Representation, and the Necessary Question 
of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 435 (2006). 
50 Dixon, supra note 18, at 368. 
51 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Redis-
tricting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002); see also 
BICKEL, supra note 22, at 196 (“The point decided was not what function the Court is to 
perform in legislative apportionment, and certainly not whether it is to take over full 
management, but whether it can play any role at all.”). 
52 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); 
Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. 
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty 
Fourth General Assembly  of the State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); see Robert G. 
Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and “One Man, One Vote,” in REAPPORTIONMENT IN 
THE 1970’S 7, 11 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1970). 
53 Dixon, supra note 46, at 210; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“These decisions, with Wesberry v. Sanders, involving congres-
sional districting by the States, and Gray v. Sanders, relating to elections for statewide 
office, have the effect of placing basic aspects of state political systems under the perva-
sive overlordship of the federal judiciary.”); see also Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of 
Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606 (1999) (“In the relatively short time 
since [Baker], the United States Supreme Court has not only entered the ‘political 
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derscores how prescient Dixon’s sentiment was and how close it came to 
describe the controversy surrounding the aftermath of the 2000 presiden-
tial election.  The case, of course, is Bush v. Gore.54 
This section does not retell this oft-told story, nor does it offer any 
new insights about the Court’s handling of what is easily the most politi-
cally-charged case in recent memory.55 Instead, it makes two modest 
claims.  The first claim looks back to Baker and the reasons that thrust 
the Court into the realm of politics.  At their core, the similarities be-
tween Baker and Bush v. Gore are striking,56 to the point that Bush is 
nothing but a logical if extreme extension of Baker.57 And so Justice 
Frankfurter must get his due, as his concerns have come to pass and the 
Court has become another political actor, taking sides in politically 
charged controversies.58 A distinct difference, of course, lies in the nor-
mative reasons for the Court to take the initial step of “deciding to de-
cide.”  The Court in Baker had impeccable reasons, grounded in what 
was a clear failure of the political process.  It is difficult to offer a strong 
defense of the Court’s intervention here, though some commentators 
have certainly tried.59 If anything, the political process appeared to be 
working too well.  And so the lessons of the case are both clear and un-
controversial: the Court is mired in our politics, willing and ready to 
strike a blow for our constitutional democracy. 
The second claim situates the case within our political question tra-
dition, and agrees that the case raised a political question.  By this I don’t 
mean a political question in the crude sense of day-to-day politics, of the 
world inhabited by Republicans and Democrats; of course Bush v. Gore 
thicket,’ but with remarkable speed has found conflicts of democratic politics coming to 
dominate its docket.”). 
54 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
55 See David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1427 
(2006) (“Few cases in the Supreme Court’s 200-plus year history have more deeply 
tested its institutional legitimacy than Bush v. Gore.”). 
56 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative 
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMM. 359, 390 (2001) (“Bush is Baker v. Carr in conservative 
garb.”). 
57 See Richard L. Hasen, A “Tincture of Justice”: Judge Posner’s Failed Rehabili-
tation of Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (book review) (“Reynolds v. 
Sims, whether it is good or bad politics, begets Bush v. Gore.”). 
58 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554; see also Michael C. Dorf and Samuel Issa-
charoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 932-33 (2001) 
(“The pointillism of their decision aimed to avoid entanglement in future political thick-
ets, even as they emerged badly bloodied from the thorns of Bush v. Gore itself. Some-
where, Justice Frankfurter is chuckling.”). 
59 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Richard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as the 
Legislature Thereof May Direct:” The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 613 (2001); Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1219 (2002). 
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is that. Rather, I mean it in the doctrinal sense, which places the case in 
distinguished company, with Luther v. Borden60 and Pacific States Tel. 
Co. v. Oregon.61 To be sure, many commentators have situated Bush v. 
Gore within this tradition.62 Yet the crucial insight of the political ques-
tion doctrine cannot be understated and often goes unnoticed: it is not 
that particular questions are textually committed to the political branches 
rather than the courts.  This aspect of the political question doctrine – 
known as its classical strand – has ceased to do any work for quite some 
time.63 Instead, the real bite of the political question doctrine lies in its 
prudential strand: courts choose to intervene in or abstain from deciding 
particular controversies for pragmatic reasons, often out of a real con-
cern that its edicts will go underenforced.64 Such was the case in Cole-
grove v. Green and Luther v. Borden, and there is very little reason to 
think that this should not have been Bush v. Gore.
Let me be clear: in Bush v. Gore, the per curiam opinion professed 
an inability to decline to hear the case.  The language here was of an 
“unsought responsibility.”65 But this is clearly misleading.  The Court 
could have declined to hear this case, and in fact, if the prudential politi-
cal question doctrine retained any vitality whatsoever, the Court would 
have been wise to let the political process run its course.  Yet the Court 
plunged ahead and essentially stopped the Florida recount,66 confident 
that its edict would not go unenforced.  And so the real insight of Bush v. 
Gore lies precisely here: public perceptions about judicial supremacy are 
so strong, and the Court’s legitimacy so secure, that the justices no 
longer need to hide behind platitudes such as “political questions” and 
“judicially manageable standards.”  The political question doctrine is 
 
60 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
61 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
62 See Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH V. GORE: A QUESTION OF 
LEGITIMACY 129-41 (Bruce Ackerman, ed.2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was 
Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093, 1105-09 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 639-41(2001); Jeffrey Rosen, Political 
Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism, in BUSH V. GORE, supra, at 145-62; Laurence 
H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571 (2002). 
63 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political 
Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899 (2006). 
64 See id.
65 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (“When contending parties invoke the process of the 
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and consti-
tutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”). 
66 See L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on 
the Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 730-31 
(2003) (explaining that “the claim in Bush v. Gore that deciding the election was an ‘un-
sought responsibility’ rings hollow. The Court could have avoided the responsibility by 
denying certiorari.”). 
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dead, and the Court is clearly in charge of our politics, ready to act and 
unafraid of any negative repercussions. 
In saying this, I do not mean to criticize the Court’s handling of the 
litigation in Bush. If anything, this case offered a much-needed correc-
tive to the classical view of the Court as detached from politics.  Candor 
about the Court and its work is important and often lacking in popular 
accounts of the Court.  What I take from Bush is the Court’s insistence to 
treat these politically charged questions as run-of-the-mill constitutional 
questions.  Political questions are no longer a special breed of case.  
Questions of judicial power and standards no longer offer any resistance. 
III. Confusion and Incoherence in the Law of Democracy: A Short 
Survey 
Bush v. Gore is not an isolated example of the Court’s aggressive 
handling of questions of politics.  It is standard fare.  This is true even in 
areas where moderation would appear to present a better approach.  The 
wrongful districting cases, discussed in the first section, offer a poignant 
example.  The second section examines the political gerrymandering 
cases, an area where the Court displays a cautious side we no longer see.  
This is puzzling, particularly because questions about judicial power and 
standards for adjudication have been settled long ago.  This was the re-
apportionment revolution.  Taken together, the first two sections lead to 
incoherence in the law of democracy.  This is the subject of the third sec-
tion. 
A. The Politics of Race 
Consider first the wrongful districting cases, the source of much con-
troversy and disarray.67 To begin, take a legislature during a redistricting 
session.  Assuming partisan control of all necessary posts, one would 
expect legislative outcomes to reflect the partisan attitudes and desires of 
their authors.  Throw into the mix controlling federal law, and particu-
larly pre-clearance and vote dilution requirements under the Voting 
Rights Act,68 and the legislative handiwork immediately increases in 
 
67 For criticisms of the Court’s forays in this area, see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, 
The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45; Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN L. REV.
731 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistrict-
ing, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000).  The vote dilution requirement is codified under sec-
tion 2 of the Act.  It essentially proscribes, under a totality of circumstances inquiry, 
whether “members of a class of citizens protected by [the statute] . . . have less opportu-
nity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973.  The non-retrogression re-
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complexity.  On this scenario, the controlling party could give up hope 
and relent to the federal pressures not of its own making, while stretch-
ing its partisan gains as much as possible; or it could attempt to comply 
yet hold onto previous gains. 
The North Carolina legislature found itself in this unenviable posi-
tion during the fall of 1991.  Soon after submitting its newly crafted re-
districting plan in order to comply with its pre-clearance requirement, 
the Department of Justice refused to pre-clear it, on the view that one 
majority minority district would not be enough to comply with section 5.  
The legislature then called a special session the following January 1992 
and drafted a plan that sought to comply with DOJ’s request while hold-
ing onto its previous political gains.  This balancing act required great 
artistry, and to some North Carolinians, the legislature could not legiti-
mately pull it off.   
This is a nutshell account of the political process leading up to 
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny.  At first blush, the facts pointed clearly in 
the direction of partisan shenanigans, and the plaintiffs so understood 
them, grounding their initial claim on the Court’s partisan gerrymander-
ing doctrine.  The lower court did not buy it, and neither did the Supreme 
Court.69 Undeterred, the plaintiffs tried again, this time on a racial ger-
rymandering claim.  Their evidence consisted of maps, DOJ’s insistence 
on a second majority black district, and the fact that a black legislator 
had won the contested seat. 
On these facts, it takes some effort to conclude that the redistricting 
plan must be subject to strict scrutiny review.  To be sure, racial factors 
played a role during the deliberations, as they must in order for the state 
to comply with the Voting Rights Act.  But if that is all it would take to 
subject any districting plan to the Court’s most exacting review, then it 
would make far more sense to stage a frontal assault on the Act rather 
than encourage piecemeal litigation.  And so the Court held, rather, that 
the constitutional infirmity stemmed from the use of race in the manner 
in which North Carolina used it, as part of a plan “so irrational on its 
face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into 
 
quirement is codified under section 5 of the Act.  Under this requirement, the Department 
of Justice may not allow changes in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act if 
these changes “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 
U.S. 130, 141 (1976).  
69 See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. NC 1992), summarily affirmed 506 
U.S. 801 (1992). 
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separate districts because of their race.”70 This type of harm came to be 
known as an “expressive harm.”71 Or, in the Court’s oft-cited words,  
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district in-
dividuals who belong to the same race, but who are oth-
erwise widely separated by geographical and political 
boundaries, and who may have little in common with 
one another but the color of their skin . . . reinforces the 
perception that members of the same racial group . . . 
think alike, share the same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the polls.72 
While the Court conceded that this was a claim “analytically distinct”73 
from prior race cases, there was nothing new here, for “[w]e have re-
jected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.”74 
This case has a clear explanation.  The Court understood the map in 
Shaw as an example of uber-race consciousness,75 as flashing the mes-
sage “RACE, RACE, RACE” in big, bold letters, for the entire world to 
see.76 More perniciously, one may interpret it as conveying a message of 
extreme race consciousness in the pursuit of districting goals.  As John 
Hart Ely eloquently put it, the message is “‘in your face,’” and may lead 
one to conclude: “Is there no length to which they won't go to help Black 
people?”77 For the Court, the facts in Shaw offer an “ostentatious dis-
play of race consciousness run amok,” instances of “in-your-face visual 
representations of racial interest as raw political power.”78 The Court 
sees race, the Court does not like race, and so the Court applies strict 
scrutiny.  How the Court can get all this information from the map and 
the factual setting, of course, is in itself a difficult and troubling ques-
tion.79 Unsurprisingly, the Court ultimately struck down the districting 
plan.80 
70 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) 
71 See Richard H. Pildes and Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Dis-
tricts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH L. REV. 483 (1993). 
72 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. 
73 Id. at 652. 
74 Id. at 647. 
75 Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 7, 240-41 (2001). 
76 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: 
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 610-11 (1993). 
77 John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 607, 615 (1998). 
78 Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 7, at 240-41. 
79 See MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS 
MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS (2001); Hampton 
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None of this should be terribly surprising.  As with Bush v. Gore,
this is the kind of aggressive posture we have come to expect from the 
Court.  Politics may be “nasty, brutish, and short,” unbounded in either 
risks or complexities, yet the justices hardly worry as they once did.  
Aggressive review is the order of the day, irrespective of risk or com-
plexity. 
B. Muddling Through our Politics 
Compare the scenario in the wrongful districting cases to the more 
traditional gerrymandering claim, as examined in Vieth v. Jubelirer.81 
The same set of conditions exist: a rogue legislature, hell-bent on enact-
ing the partisan plan of its choice; total partisan control of the redistrict-
ing process; and a forgiving – perhaps non-existent – doctrinal canvass.  
The one absent player in this setting was the Department of Justice, and 
that made all the difference in the world.  Without an institutional push 
to imbue race into the process, the outrage was restrained and altogether 
different.  And the Court responded in kind. 
To be sure, the political gerrymandering doctrine is replete with half-
steps, missteps, and even non-steps.  Soon after Baker, for example, the 
Court refused to explicitly adjudicate these questions, deciding instead to 
monitor them through related yet indirect means.  Chief among these has 
been the equipopulation standard, which the Court applied with unrelent-
ing rigor in Karcher v. Daggett.82 Once the Court officially declared the 
justiciability of these questions in the fractured Davis v. Bandemer,83 our 
democracy hardly felt its effects.  The recent Vieth v. Jubelirer once 
again put in full display the Court’s struggle with the hated gerrymander.  
While a plurality argued that judicially manageable standards are un-
availing, Justice Kennedy is still looking for one, unwilling for the Court 
to abdicate the field just yet.  LULAC v. Perry84 – as blatant a political 
gerrymander as we are likely to see – did not improve matters, as Justice 
Kennedy decided the case on alternate grounds. 
This posture should strike us as odd and misconceived.  Having set 
the question of power aside generations ago, it seems too late in the day 
to argue that standards are lacking, or power unavailing.  The Court has 
 
Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome use of Photographs, Maps, and Other 
Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997).  
80 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
81 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
82 462 U.S. 725 (1983); see Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949-50 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“After our recent decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), the 
equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting prac-
tices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.”). 
83 478 US 109 (1986). 
84 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
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power to do anything it wants, and myriad standards exist, coming prac-
tically from all corners of the academy.  More troubling still, political 
gerrymandering claims are the one area of the law of democracy where 
judicial intervention appears normatively warranted.  What would be 
more in need of judicial supervision than the very process whereby the 
people in power are also entrusted with the duty to draw district lines?85 
The facts seem uncomplicated: this is one area where the political mar-
ket appears to have failed, as the ins have choked off all avenues of po-
litical change in order to remain in power.86 If electoral competition is 
the sine qua non of politics, then clearly our political process is one 
place where judicial intervention is decidedly justified.87
The successes of the reapportionment revolution should put any and 
all doubts to rest.  First, it is very difficult to decide Baker yet set gerry-
mandering questions aside as unfit for judicial resolution.  The issues are 
one and the same.88 The early cases worried about political representa-
tion and how much change could be expected from a political process 
that could no longer be trusted to function properly.  These same worries 
arise in the political gerrymandering context.  Second, the question of 
standards is similar in both contexts and makes it hard to accept the 
Court at its word that standards are lacking in the political gerrymander-
ing context.  It is hard to accept this argument coming from the same 
institution that brought us Reynolds v. Sims, which introduced and en-
forced the equipopulation standard by fiat and irrespective of history, 
tradition, or constitutional precedent.  The Shaw doctrine, with its ana-
lytically-distinct “expressive harms” inquiry; and Miller v. Johnson,89 
which introduced the “predominant factor” test, only strengthen this ar-
gument. 
Any remaining hesitancy to discern or apply heretofore-unknown 
standards should be put to rest in light of the recent Larios v. Cox.90 In 
Larios, the district court, clearly disturbed by the naked partisan nature 
of the plan, struck down the Georgia state districting plan on equal pro-
tection grounds.  To the court, all traditional districting principles, from 
 
85 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 594 (2002). 
86 See ELY, supra note 47, at 103 (“[A] political malfunction deserving of judicial 
correction “occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when . . . the ins are choking 
off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay 
out.””); Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 65 
("Voters no longer choose members of the House [of Representatives]; the people who 
draw the [district] lines do." (quoting Samuel Issacharoff)). 
87 See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. 
REV. 269 (2006). 
88 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 49. 
89 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
90 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Georgia 2004). 
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compactness and contiguity to preserving the cores of pre-existing dis-
tricts and county lines, were ignored in the name of partisan advantage.  
Hence: 
We cannot escape the conclusion that the population de-
viations were designed to allow Democrats to maintain 
or increase their representation in the House and Senate 
through the underpopulation of districts in Democratic-
leaning rural and inner-city areas of the state and 
through the protection of Democratic incumbents and 
the impairment of Republican incumbents’ reelection 
prospects.91 
These are not legitimate state interests, and so the plans did not with-
stand constitutional scrutiny. Curiously, the U.S. Supreme Court summa-
rily affirmed.92 
Larios exemplifies the role played by judicial will and the feign im-
potence displayed by the Court in its political gerrymandering jurispru-
dence.93 The lower court could see the obvious and struck down the plan 
under equal protection principles.  For the Court to suggest an inability 
to behave otherwise is both implausible and suspect. 
C. The Failings of our Modern Philosopher Kings 
This last section underscores that ironies and follies of the law of 
democracy.  Compare, for example, the contrasting judicial approaches 
in Vieth and Shaw. In Vieth, we see a clear use of the redistricting proc-
ess for partisan gains, without the extreme racial component witnessed in 
Shaw. But while in Shaw the Court saw “uber-race,” in Vieth the Court 
saw “uber-politics.”  These cases were really this simple.  Race is con-
demned across the board, yet politics are treated delicately, if at all. This 
is perverse for a number of reasons.   
In an earlier case, for example, Justice O’Connor warned that  
the Court’s “reflexive application of precedent ignores the 
maxim that ‘[p]articularly in dealing with claims under 
broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content 
an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is im-
perative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the 
concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be ap-
 
91 Id. at 1334. 
92 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
93 See Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to draw the Line?: Judi-
cial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 568 (2004). 
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plied out of context in disregard of variant controlling 
facts.”94 
“In cases such as this one,” Justice O’Connor continued, “it is not 
enough to cite precedent: we should examine it for possible limits, and if 
they are lacking, for possible flaws.”95 This is a remarkable assertion, 
particularly in light of Shaw, where the Court deployed any and all 
available precedents in pursuit of its questionable conclusion, while dis-
tinguishing unhelpful cases.96 Shaw was as reflexive an application of 
precedent as we will ever see, even while, paradoxically, the Court 
carved a new cause of action out of this worn and misguided cloth.  But 
Shaw involved race, of course, not politics.  And therein lies the differ-
ence. 
Ironies abound.  The Justice O’Connor of the political gerryman-
dering cases worries about inviting the losing side in every reapportion-
ment to fight their battles anew in the federal courts;97 about opening the 
doors of the federal courts to “pervasive and unwarranted judicial super-
intendence of the legislative task of apportionment;”98 and besides, the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended to create a group 
right to representational equality.99 Yet curiously, Shaw did exactly these 
things, in an analogous context, and we heard nary a complaint from the 
non-justiciability faction.  The map alone told us everything we needed 
to know.  Ely captured this point with characteristic wit: “We don’t know 
how, we don’t know why, but this district has got to be unconstitutional, 
so somebody, anybody, must have standing to raise the claim.”100 
The Court displays a similar approach across the law of democracy.  
In Shaw, the Court behaved assertively, yet in the last installment of the 
Shaw-line, Easley v. Cromartie,101 the Court was somehow able to deci-
pher whether the use of race predominated during the redistricting proc-
ess.102 The Court concluded that race did not predominate, despite prot-
estations from the dissenting justices that the Court was not reviewing 
 
94 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145-46 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339-343-44 (1960)). 
95 Id. at 146. 
96 E.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 651-52 (distinguishing UJO v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144 (1977)). 
97 Davis, 478 U.S. at 147. 
98 Id.
99 See id.
100 John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 576, 579-80 (1997). 
101 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
102 See Ely, supra note 77, at 611 (labeling Miller’s test a “dominant purpose” test, 
and asserting that these tests “aren’t simply vague and manipulable; they are incoher-
ent”). 
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the lower court case under the proper standard of clear error.103 Hardly 
coincidentally, we see a similar dynamic in LULAC, with a Court major-
ity overturning a lower court ruling as clear error, against arguments in 
dissent that this high threshold had not been met.   
In Rutan v. Republican Party,104 the Court struck down patronage 
practices in employment on First Amendment grounds.  Justice Scalia 
dissented, as he concluded that a constitutional ban on patronage “re-
flects a naïve vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the sys-
temic effects of patronage in promoting political stability and facilitating 
the social and political integration of politically powerless groups.”105 
He complained that this ban on patronage practices has weakened the 
parties and has in turn led to the rise of interest groups.  Yet, in California 
Democratic Party v. Jones,106 the Court struck down a blanket primary 
system, a system under which “all persons entitled to vote, including 
those not affiliated with any political party, shall have the right to vote . . 
. for any candidate regardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.”107 
While Jones upholds the worth of party autonomy, the patronage deci-
sions take a contrary view.  But the ironies hardly end there. 
For Justice Scalia, patronage practices are a way to fulfill “the social 
and political integration of excluded groups;”108 its abolition, he com-
plains, “"prevents groups that have only recently obtained political 
power, especially blacks, from following this path to economic and social 
advancement."109 Yet, and quite perversely, blacks better not attempt to 
put this newfound power to use, in the form of social goods and preferen-
tial policies, as the Court, including Justice Scalia, stands ready to strike 
them down as examples of racial spoils and racial politics.110 For Justice 
O’Connor, the state may not discriminate on political grounds when 
awarding contracts to haul trash or tow cars;111 but similar discrimination 
 
103 See Easley, 532 U.S. at 259. 
104 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
105 Id. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For criticism of this view, and in particular 
Justice Scalia’s contention that patronage practices in fact helped disadvantaged groups, 
see Cynthia Grant Bowman, “We Don’t Want Anybody Anybody Sent:” The Death of 
Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 57 (1991) (“[T]he more a machine was 
able to consolidate its power by use of patronage, the less likely it was to fulfill the func-
tion of broadening the number of groups involved in the political process.”). 
106 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
107 Cal. Elec. Code Ann. Sec. 2001 (West Supp. 2000). 
108 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 108. 
109 Id.
110 See Adarand Constructors Inc, v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond 
v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Luis Fuentes- 
Rohwer and Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference 21 CONST. COMMENT. 133 
(2004).  
111 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O'Hare Truck 
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
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in the crafting of districting lines does not even raise a justiciable ques-
tion.112 For the dissenting faction in Shaw, the Court should stay out of 
this political minefield; yet the Court must step in and cure the political 
distortions created by excessive political gerrymandering.113 
These positions exemplify the justices’ confused approach to ques-
tions of politics.114 The justices are driven by their issue preferences, by 
their idiosyncratic views and assumptions about the political world and 
the uses to which political power can be legitimately put, and much less 
so by doctrine.  This is true across the field, from the gerrymandering and 
patronage cases and campaign finance law.115 According to a leading 
commentator, for example, “[w]here other judges have seen competitive 
practices that ensure a robust and vital democratic system, the current 
Court has seen threats to orderly democratic processes.”116 The Court 
sees chaos, in other words, and thus its willingness to step in and set the 
political structures on their proper course.  Such is the true measure of a 
philosopher king. 
IV.  A New Beginning 
A philosopher king revels in determining when the use of race pre-
dominates in a redistricting plan;117 when burdens on the ballot are se-
vere and must be “narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state in-
terest,”118 or less severe and justified by “the State’s important regulatory 
 
112 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
113 Cf., e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 679 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) with 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Term, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 289, 290 (1997) (“The Supreme Court as an institution seems 
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115 See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ide-
ology Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L. J. 345, 350 (2004) ("Ideology, not a 
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interests;”119 and when campaign finance laws prevent corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.120 These are difficult inquiries, to be sure, in-
quiries that only a philosopher king would dare undertake.   
The Court regularly plays the part of philosopher king in contempo-
rary American law.  Yet note the nature and complexity of the enterprise, 
particularly in reference to the law of democracy.  What in the world 
could corruption possibly mean in the context of campaign finance?121 
The Court provides little guidance on this score, treating the term as an 
ipse dixit.122 When are burdens on the ballot severe or less so?  The 
Court offers myriad admonitions about the case-by-case nature of this 
inquiry,123 while conceding that the proof is in the application.124 And 
when exactly does race “predominate” during the redistricting proc-
ess?125 The Court’s answer is wholly unsatisfying on this score. 
The challenges posed by the law of democracy are difficult and 
complex.  Yet, as noted previously, the Court’s performance as democ-
ratic engineer is not worthy of much confidence.  It is confused and in-
coherent.  Assertiveness in one area is closely followed by passivity in 
another, and justifications for some actions are rejected as insufficient in 
others. 
This final Part offers two paths of reform.  The first section argues 
that the Court should turn back to the promise of Baker v. Carr, a prom-
ise grounded in rationality review and the pursuit of legitimate state in-
terests.  The second section contends that, absent a move away from ag-
gressive review, the Court should reject its modern posture and overturn 
Baker. It is time to leave the thicket at last. 
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A. Back to the Promise of Baker 
While opening the field of democracy for judicial review, Baker v. 
Carr stopped short of aggressive review.  The Court wrote a very doc-
trinal opinion while careful to sidestep – not overrule – existing prece-
dents. This was a very shallow opinion, as the Court said precious little 
about underlying theories of political representation and offered instead 
a rationality test.126 Baker was also a narrow decision, as the Court lim-
ited the case to its facts.127 So long as its holding applied to other cases, 
it was only “to the extent that one decision necessarily bears on other 
cases.”128 Baker is thus a prototypical minimalist decision.129
Such was the promise of Baker. The Court did not enter the redis-
tricting field in full force, but only decided the question of whether to 
play a role in redistricting at all.130 The Court did little else, as exempli-
fied by its adoption of a rationality standard, a standard that might be 
said to lead nowhere, “for most apportionments can be deemed irrational 
only if the legislature is a priori foreclosed from pursuing certain pur-
poses, such as over-representation of some or of all rural areas.”131 Yet 
the state of Tennessee proved to be that extreme case, as the legislature 
had failed to redistrict for many years, thus rendering a finding of ration-
ality quite easy.132 In this way, Alexander Bickel read Baker as a case 
where the Court was prodding the political process into action and going 
no further.  To Bickel, the Court had simply “opened a colloquy, posing 
to the political institutions of Tennessee the question of apportionment, 
not answering it for them.”133 As soon as the legislature passed a new 
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Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 (1996) (“In a parallel process, judges may 
adopt a standard in the form of a ‘reasonableness’ test instead of deciding the appropriate 
rule.”). 
127 See Abner Mikva, What Justice Brennan Gave Us to Keep, 32 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 655, 656-57 (1999) (“[A]lthough Justice Brennan had votes to burn for his opinion, 
he still kept the language of Baker v. Carr narrow.”). 
128 Sunstein, supra note 126, at 15. 
129 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Su-
preme Court (1999). 
130 BICKEL, supra note 22, at 196 (“The point decided was not what function the 
Court is to perform in legislative apportionment, and certainly not whether it is to take 
over full management, but whether it can play any role at all.”). 
131 Id.
132 Id. (explaining that the situation in Tennessee is the result “not of deliberate if 
imperfect present judgment of the political institutions, but merely of inertia and oligar-
chic entrenchment”) 
133 Id.; see Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 
VAND. L. REV. 829, 836 (1962) (“The Supreme Court has not attempted to define what 
are the inequities of representation or to prescribe remedies.  It has issued merely a call 
for action.”).  Phil Neal strongly disagrees with the Court’s approach as interpreted by 
Leaving the Thicket 
 
25
statute, “curing the situation in some degree,” the need for judicial inter-
vention would end.134 
This is the proper posture for the law of democracy writ large. The 
Court must approach questions in the field with a measure of respect for 
the choices made by the political branches.  Minimalism is particularly 
important in this area, for the Court is ultimately taking sides in politi-
cally charged controversies and elevating one policy preference over 
another.  This is true as an abstract proposition, yet more so in light of 
the incoherence prevalent in the field.  The Court must only demand, as 
in Baker, a showing that the challenged statute pursues legitimate state 
interest.  This is a standard of heightened rationality, or what Gerald 
Gunther labeled “rationality with bite.”135 This was the posture adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Baker and by the lower court in Larios, which 
was summarily affirmed by the Court.  The Supreme Court should ex-
tend this standard to the law of elections. 
B. A Time to Go 
The Court has exhausted its capacity to regulate the law of democ-
racy effectively.  Its handling of questions of politics is confused and 
confusing, often incoherent, and exemplifies how judicial review is a 
cure worse than the disease.  In response, this final section concludes 
that, absent a move to a standard of heightened rationality across the 
field, the Court should exit the thicket and return the doctrine to the days 
of Colegrove v. Green.
What would a world without judicial review of politics look like?  
For one, it would be a world with the political branches at the helm, in 
charge of designing the structures of our democracy and accountable to 
the public while doing so.  This would mean, more specifically, that the 
equal protection clause would lose its preferred position among litigants 
seeking to challenge their prior losses in the political process.  It would 
also mean that the Court will no longer need to turn policy arguments 
into legal ones, while at the same time keeping them consistent from ar-
guments in related areas.   
This argument is subject to the criticism that it will give the politi-
cal branches a free pass to rig the system to their advantage.  I am recep-
tive to this position; after all, nobody wants to support a system where 
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“the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that 
they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”136 And yet, it is clear the law 
of democracy is currently not all that interested in keeping the political 
branches in check.  For example, the political gerrymandering doctrine 
would change very little if the Court were to leave these questions alone.  
Campaign finance cases – up until the recent Randall v. Sorrell case137 – 
and ballot access questions also would not change very much if the 
Court were to exit from the regulation of politics.  These are areas where 
the Court has markedly deferred to the political branches.   
In the ballot access cases, for example, the Court has proven very 
attentive to the rights of major political parties, much less so of the rights 
of third parties.  The Court takes this position quite far, explaining in 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party that “[t]he Constitution permits 
the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served 
through a healthy two-party system.”138 Under the Court’s understand-
ing of the political process, major parties ineluctably win, minor parties 
lose.139 The value of political stability, and particularly the Court’s un-
derstanding of how to achieve such stability, rules the day.140 
Two important benefits would accrue from this proposal.  First, the 
biggest change in the doctrine would be with respect to voters of color, 
as the Court would cease to examine the use of race in crafting electoral 
structures under its highest and most exacting level of review.  This 
would be welcomed news, as it would mean that the Court would finally 
begin to treat voters of colors as “grown-ups who, generally speaking, 
can take care of themselves.”141 Rather than treat any gain by voters of 
color as suspect and subject to strict scrutiny review, the Court might 
finally concede that Gomillion is not Shaw, and that people of color can 
“pull, haul and trade to find common political ground” with others.142 
And second, this would bring much needed candor to the role of the 
Court in our politics.143 We should stop wishing for the Court to be 
something that it is clearly not.  Countermajoritarian stories aside, the 
Court seldom pushes back against majoritarian policy preferences as re-
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flected in enacted law.144 For better or for worse, the law of democracy 
is no exception.  Rather than wish for a different institution – an institu-
tion, I must point out, we have seldom seen in American history – we 
should instead wish for the doctrine to reflect the Court as we know it.   
Conclusion 
Four decades have elapsed since the Court entered the political 
thicket in Baker v. Carr. And unfortunately, the evidence is decidedly 
mixed.  To be sure, the early days of the reapportionment revolution 
brought about needed change within the stagnant legislative processes 
across the nation.  But as the Court gained confidence in its handling of 
political questions, its posture became increasingly aggressive.  And of 
course, this aggressiveness is quite selective and not always consistent 
across the field. 
We could go on making the arguments we do and behaving as if it 
all makes sense.  Or else, as this Essay argues, we could exhort the Court 
to exit the political thicket.  Over the course of four decades, the Court 
has had its chance to regulate the field of democracy.  The evidence is in, 
and not very flattering: the doctrine is confused, incoherent, and driven 
by judicial attitudes and the justices’ notions of good public policy.  We 
should pretend no longer.  It is time for the Court to leave the political 
thicket at last. 
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